Alexander Hamilton and Indiana Courts

ALEXANDER HAMILTON wrote the following in Federalist 68: “…there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers. And it proves, in the last place, that as liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have everything to fear from its union with either of the other departments…”

A new rule recently proposed by an Indiana Supreme Court committee calls to mind Hamilton’s wisdom. The proposed rule is an amendment to Indiana Trial Rule 60, and says, under subsection (E):  

On motion, the court may relieve a person from juvenile adjudication for any reason justifying relief. The motion must allege a basis for setting aside the adjudication and may be filed at any time. The court must set the motion promptly for a hearing or otherwise rule on the motion on an expedited basis.

There are two major issues with this proposed rule: it has obvious flaws, and the rule and the process of its adoption violates the separation of powers.

First, the proposed rule is plainly flawed. The rule allows a person to ask the court to set aside a juvenile adjudication for any reason at any time. As a general principle, we do not want people who have gotten their lives together after a turbulent adolescence to be negatively impacted by their juvenile court cases. Yet this general principle has important caveats the proposed rule ignores.

Under the proposed rule, there are no limits on what kinds of cases could be set aside, on when the motion to set aside could be brought, or on how many times the person can ask. That sets up the following worst-case but totally plausible scenario: let’s say a now 25-year-old man was adjudicated for rape as a juvenile. Under this new rule, he could request that his juvenile adjudication be set aside. The prosecutor would need to contact the victim, reopening the painful experience. The victim may need to come to court to testify about why the adjudication should not be set aside. If the court were to deny the person’s motion, he could, under this rule, just file it again the next day. He could continue to file it without limit. Each filing would be an additional hit to the victim. Clearly, a bad rule.

The other major problem with this rule is that it is a violation of the separation of powers. This is not just a procedural rule; it is broad-sweeping public policy. Such public policy decisions are properly made by the legislature, not the courts. This is because the courts are largely unaccountable to the people.

Some may retort that Supreme Court rules are subject to public comment, which gives “the people” an opportunity to participate. There certainly is a public comment period, but that process cannot in good faith be described as involving the public. We have a process for involving the public—the legislative process. Legislation is proposed, then goes through extensive public hearings where all facets are debated.

Here’s an example. The Indiana criminal code was revised in 2014. At that time, the penalties for most crimes were reduced. The question arose whether people sentenced under the old criminal code should be allowed to request modifications of their sentences from courts given that they would likely be lower under the new code. A bill was proposed to do just that. The bill was thoroughly and contentiously debated in the legislature. When it began, the bill proposed to allow any defendant to request to modify his sentence. The final product, however, due to legitimate debate, limited the number of times a person could request modification and exempted violent offenses from the process. Exempting violent offenses came after crime victims came to the legislative committee hearings to testify about the emotional pain they would experience having to relive the crime in modification hearings.

Similarly, in the 2023 Indiana Legislative Session, the Legislature heavily amended the juvenile expungement statute. The Legislature explicitly stated in I.C. 31-39-8-3(e), that any court considering expunging a juvenile record should consider many factors, including whether the person had committed a violent offense.

The Court’s new proposed change to Trial Rule 60 lacks the informed debate that occurs in the legislative process, as happened in the criminal code reform bill. It also circumvents the juvenile expungement statute that the legislature just passed. The Court would be behaving like a super-legislature in imposing significant public policy change if this rule were to be adopted. As Hamilton wrote, we should fear the union of the judiciary with the other branches, particularly the legislative branch, as has happened here.

Just recently, the Supreme Court declined to take up this proposed rule, following some push back from at least one very talented and informed Magistrate Judge. This is a step in the right direction. The proposed rule still lingers, though. The Supreme Court should have the rule withdrawn as a proposal entirely, should refrain from making public policy, and should focus on deciding discreet cases and controversies as our Constitution, heeding Hamilton’s words, contemplates.