The compassion-industrial complex

This is the final installment in a series on the problems with problem-solving courts. The first installment demonstrated the lack of research supporting the efficacy of problem-solving courts. The second installment dealt with separation of powers issues involved in the creation and operation of problem-solving courts. The third installment highlighted research showing that the real reason judges create such courts is that it is fulfilling for the judge to do so, raising ethical and moral concerns. This installment will point out the conflicts of interest associated with the problem-solving court movement.

Note: the irony of dropping a piece critical of compassion on Valentine’s day is not lost on me. I asked my wife if that would be a problem. She said, “no, seems about right for you.” So, here you go.

With the rapid growth of problem-solving courts, a whole industry has sprung up around them. You might call it the compassion-industrial complex. This leads to interests and incentives that raise concerns.

On the front lines of the compassion-industrial complex are the “stakeholders.” Problem-solving courts employ a collaborative approach where a team of stakeholders meets to attempt to reach consensus on how to handle a particular defendant’s case. The team generally has a prosecutor, defense attorney, and a judge as members, but the bulk of the membership is made up of various types of social workers. There are case workers, licensed clinical social workers, therapists, drug counsellors, program coordinators, peer mentors, and others. Rarely do teams include psychiatrists or other highly qualified personnel. The jobs of these people are all reliant, at least in part, on the problem-solving court’s continued existence. The organizations they belong to rely on grants, occasionally from non-profits, but primarily from the state or federal government. To get and keep the grants, the organization must put up numbers. If you are not careful, the need for numbers can become the end itself. The overriding goal of a problem-solving court can become feeding the problem-solving court.

This “feeding” occurs when otherwise unqualified individuals are accepted into the program because the numbers are getting low, or when unsuccessful participants are not discharged because to do so would hurt the numbers. These allowances are made in the name of compassion, but it is far from compassionate to allow defendants to self-immolate to pad the end-of-year report.      

The next level of the compassion-industrial complex is the national-corporate apparatus. The main hub of this is the National Association of Drug Court Professionals (NADCP). The NADCP is the “premier training, membership, and advocacy organization for the treatment court model,” according to their website. Judges are the primary members of the NADCP, but it is tightly woven with corporate interests. The NADCP suffers from the same negative tendencies as the local teams. In her University of California, Davis Law Review Article entitled, The Problem with Problem-Solving Courts, University of Richmond School of Law professor, Erin Collins points out some disturbing issues with NADCP.

NADCP proudly declares on its website that treatment courts “save considerable money for taxpayers,” and specifies that the courts “produce benefits of $6,208 per participant, returning up to $2 for every $1 invested.” In support of this claim, the website links to the National Institution of Justice’s 2011 Multi-State Adult Drug Court Evaluation (MADCE). The [MADCE] study did find that the “net benefit of drug courts is an average of $5,680 to $6,208 per participant, returning $2 for every $1 of cost.” Crucially, however, the MADCE researchers specify, “these findings are not statistically significant.” Yet, NADCP fails to mention this qualification of the research findings, as well as the researchers’ ultimate conclusion that, while drug courts reduce “costly criminal offending,” the courts are also expensive enough to offset those costs.”

Nor does the NADCP highlight other less favorable findings of the MADCE study, such as the researchers’ conclusions that “it now appears doubtful that drug courts produce a consistent reduction in incarceration” on the case that led to the individual’s participation in drug court.

In a separately published summary of their findings, the researchers explained, “drug courts do not appear to operate as a reliable alternative to incarceration on the precipitating case.”

These claims by the NADCP are amplified by state and local organizations promoting problem-solving courts and are used to support the growth of the courts.

In addition to the shaky empirical support for problem-solving courts and the claims the NADCP makes about them, financial interests further taint the process. Every year, the NADCP hosts a national conference. Problem-solving court team members from around the country descend on an attractive locale to absorb breakfast buffets and PowerPoint slides. It is a good conference, I’m told. Good speakers. National speakers, even. Plane tickets, hotel rooms, and conference fees are paid by local problem-solving court budgets, which are funded primarily by tax dollars with some non-profit contributions. A substantial portion of local problem-solving court budgets go to sending team members to the national conference. Perhaps not the highest and best use of resources. 

The real money, however, comes from the sponsors. The NADPC website unblushingly lists the corporate sponsors. Each one is a company that profits from providing services to problem-solving courts. I will append the full list to the bottom of this article, but it is primarily large companies that provide drug testing and electronic monitoring services. Their interest, of course, is in getting and keeping people in problem-solving courts.  

Within this context, the whole thing starts to feel a little creepy. Like the defendant is just a conduit directing taxpayer dollars to corporate profits and problem-solving court team members’ paychecks and pseudo-vacations. It reminds me of the way the machines in the Matrix movie put humans in battery pods to generate power for the robots. With the same rationale, too: “This is better for you.”   

Given these concerning conflicts and financial incentives, the continued use and expansion of problem-solving courts should be questioned. At a minimum, there should be stricter vigilance of actions taken in the name of compassion.

Appendix

NADCP CONFERENCE SPONSORS

Platinum Sponsors

Abbott Labs- toxicology testing

Invidior- pharmaceutical company

ThermoFisher Scientific- drug testing supplies

Gold Sponsors

Averhealth- drug testing supply company

RePath- product provides text message reminders to defendants and GPS monitoring

Silver Sponsors

Corrisoft- electronic monitoring

DTPM- drug testing company

Pharmchem- drug testing company

Reconnect- electronic communications between courts and defendants

Scram- digital equipment for community monitoring of defendants

Siemens- pharmaceutical company

Smartstart- ignition interlock devices

The Change Companies- curriculum for service providers

Bronze Sponsors

ACT- drug testing company

Children and Family Futures- research and training company

Equivant- software company for supervision management

Fivepoint Solutions- case management technology

Intoxalock- ignition interlock devices

Meetingmaker- digital case management

Qlabs- drug testing company

Roadguard- ignition interlock company

Seabrook- drug rehab facilities